God, Personhood, and Infinity: Against a Hickian Argument
Criticizing Richard Swinburne's conception of God, John Hick argues that God cannot be personal because infinity and personhood are mutually incompatible. An essential characteristic of a person, Hick claims, is having a boundary which distinguishes that person from other persons. But having a...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2020]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2020, Band: 12, Heft: 1, Seiten: 61-74 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Hick, John 1922-2012
/ Gott
/ Person
/ Unendlichkeit Gottes
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NBC Gotteslehre |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
John Hick
B Infinity B Personal Conception of God B Personhood |
| Online Zugang: |
Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (KW) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Criticizing Richard Swinburne's conception of God, John Hick argues that God cannot be personal because infinity and personhood are mutually incompatible. An essential characteristic of a person, Hick claims, is having a boundary which distinguishes that person from other persons. But having a boundary is incompatible with being infinite. Infinite beings are unbounded. Hence God cannot be thought of as an infinite person. In this paper, I argue that the Hickian argument is flawed because boundedness is an equivocal notion: in one sense it is not essential to personhood, and in another sense—which is essential to personhood—it is compatible with being infinite. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v12i1.2987 |