Critical Remarks on the Cognitive Science of Religion
Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption tha...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Open Library of Humanities$s2024-
[2020]
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| Dans: |
Zygon
Année: 2020, Volume: 55, Numéro: 1, Pages: 157-184 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Kognitive Religionswissenschaft
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| RelBib Classification: | AA Sciences des religions AE Psychologie de la religion |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Cultural Evolution
B adaptationism B proximate explanation B cognitive science of religion B Ultimate Explanation B Functionalism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or "adaptivism" concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12571 |