Divine authority and the virtue of religion: a Thomistic response to Murphy
In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Nature B. V
[2019]
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2019, Volume: 86, Numéro: 3, Pages: 213-226 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Thomas, von Aquin, Heiliger 1225-1274
/ Dieu
/ Autorité
/ Éthique chrétienne
/ Murphy, Mark C. 1968-
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Justice
B philosophy of religion B Aquinas B Practical authority |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Résumé: | In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from Aquinas's treatment of the virtue of religion and other parts of justice. The divine excellence is due honor, and, as Aquinas argues, honoring a ruler requires service and obedience. Thus, a classical conception of God coupled with some of Aquinas's theses concerning justice show that God has practical authority over all created, rational agents. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-019-09710-5 |