Naturalism and the Error Theory
Bart Streumer makes an interesting case for an error theory in ethics—and for an error theory for normativity more generally, but I will focus on the more restricted target. I offer a reply on behalf of naturalists (reductionists, reductive realists) in ethics. My case for resistance will involve id...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
[2018]
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2018, Volume: 8, Numéro: 4, Pages: 270-281 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
reference of moral terms
B Cognitivism B Error Theory B Naturalism B Reductionism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Bart Streumer makes an interesting case for an error theory in ethics—and for an error theory for normativity more generally, but I will focus on the more restricted target. I offer a reply on behalf of naturalists (reductionists, reductive realists) in ethics. My case for resistance will involve identifying a three-fold ambiguity in his use of the term ‘guarantee'. I conclude with some observations about the implications of theories of reference for moral/ethical terms for the debate. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Référence: | Kritik von "Précis of Unbelievable Errors (2018)"
Kritik in "Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder (2018)" |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181302 |