Punishment, Jesters and Judges: a Response to Nathan Hanna
Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not...
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| Collaborateurs: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2019, Volume: 22, Numéro: 1, Pages: 3-12 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VA Philosophie XA Droit |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Punishment
B H.L.A.Hart B Harm B Conceptual Analysis B Folk theories |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Résumé: | Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not in fact counterexamples to any view I hold, produce an example which shows that, if we accept a number of Hanna's own assumptions, punishment does not require an intention to harm, and discuss whether a definition and counter-example approach is the best way to proceed in the philosophy of punishment. I conclude with a brief exegetical discussion of H.L.A Hart's Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Référence: | Kritik in "The Nature of Punishment Revisited (2020)"
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9966-7 |