The force of the present: a Bergsonian challenge to psychophysics
Among the main targets of Bergson’s early work, Time and Free Will, are the claims of psychophysics that sensations of pain register degrees of force upon the body. If consciousness is comprised entirely of unextended qualities, and affection is a moment of consciousness, then affection must also be...
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| Type de support: | Numérique/imprimé Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Taylor & Francis
[2016]
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| Dans: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Année: 2016, Volume: 77, Numéro: 4/5, Pages: 252-272 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Bergson, Henri 1859-1941
/ Psychophysique
/ Sensation
/ Énergie
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| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie VA Philosophie VB Herméneutique; philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Bergson
B Newtonian Physics B Affection B Force B Traumatisme B Perception B Psychophysics |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Among the main targets of Bergson’s early work, Time and Free Will, are the claims of psychophysics that sensations of pain register degrees of force upon the body. If consciousness is comprised entirely of unextended qualities, and affection is a moment of consciousness, then affection must also be devoid of measurable quantities. With Matter and Memory, Bergson shifts away from the idea that sensation is completely unextended. Rather, he asserts that sensations are "vaguely localized" on the plane of matter. However, he does not address the question of whether this implies the need for a resuscitation of the notion that affection measures degrees of force emanating from the material world that was repudiated in Time and Free Will. In this essay, we ask whether there is not perhaps a place for a revised concept of force within the framework of the later work. These discussions also provide us with the opportunity to reflect upon Deleuze’s statement in Bergsonism that the present lacks an ontological status of its own. Against this assertion we argue that if affection indeed does involve the absorption of extended material forces, then it provides the basis for a restoration of an image of the real present within Bergson’s later thought. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2016.1252277 |