Apology as Self-Repair

Bernard Williams (1981) briefly discusses agent regret in his broader account of moral luck. The present paper first outlines one way to develop Williams's notion with reference to the unintended harm; it then suggests that agent regret can be counteracted by externalizing the action that cause...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Cohen, Marc A. (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2018]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2018, Band: 21, Heft: 3, Seiten: 585-598
RelBib Classification:NCB Individualethik
VA Philosophie
ZD Psychologie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Agent regret
B Externalization
B Moral injury (clinical psychology literature)
B Apology
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Bernard Williams (1981) briefly discusses agent regret in his broader account of moral luck. The present paper first outlines one way to develop Williams's notion with reference to the unintended harm; it then suggests that agent regret can be counteracted by externalizing the action that caused unintended harm, in Harry Frankfurt's (1988a, b) sense of externalization; and then the present paper argues that apology is a mechanism by which a person can externalize an offending action/effect—in that way counteracting agent regret (and possibly, though this is a further empirical point not defended here, mitigating the psychological effects). This function for apology—self-repair—is different from others described in the literature, which address the role of apology in repairing relationships. The present paper describes a nonfictional example, that of a veteran of the U.S. war in Iraq who contacts a family gravely injured by him and his combat unit; the veteran is motivated to contact the family to apologize. The example serves as a prototypical case of agent regret. The example is taken from a recent literature on the clinical psychology of (what that literature calls) self-inflicted “moral injury”; categorizing this example of moral injury as agent regret also helps broaden our understanding of moral injury as a philosophical category and as a psychological phenomenon.
ISSN:1572-8447
Enthält:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9906-6