Analogies between al-Māturīdī's and Duns Scotus's Ethical Perspectives
Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī's theory can generally be located between Ashʿarite divine command and Muʿtazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus&...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Taylor & Francis
[2017]
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| Dans: |
Islam and Christian-Muslim relations
Année: 2017, Volume: 28, Numéro: 4, Pages: 473-491 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Islamic Ethics
B Duns Scotus B Divine Command B Natural Law B Al-Māturīdī B Christian Ethics |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Résumé: | Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī's theory can generally be located between Ashʿarite divine command and Muʿtazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus's theory can be placed between William of Ockham's divine command and Thomas Aquinas's natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī's and Duns Scotus's ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: affection for justice' and affection for advantage'. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God's freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-9311 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Islam and Christian-Muslim relations
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2017.1314431 |