Skepticism and Spatial Objects
I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2018
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2018, Volume: 8, Numéro: 2, Pages: 73-95 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Scepticisme
/ Objet (Philosophie)
/ Perception visuelle
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
external world skepticism
realism
inference to the best explanation
abduction
Laurence BonJour
Jonathan Vogel
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| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) |
| Résumé: | I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour and Jonathan Vogel. It is an improved, more compelling defense, for at least two reasons. First, the attention to spatial properties, and in particular to what I call perspectival projections, makes the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis much more vivid and concrete. Second, the argument preserves and elucidates much that seems correct in the explanationist arguments others have offered while avoiding significant problems and shortcomings. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171199 |