Markus Gabriel Against the World

According to Markus Gabriel, the world does not exist. This view—baptised metametaphysical nihilism—is exposited at length in his recent book Fields of Sense, which updates his earlier project of transcendental ontology. In this paper, I question whether meta-metaphysical nihilism is internally cohe...

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Auteur principal: Hill, James (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Netherlands [2017]
Dans: Sophia
Année: 2017, Volume: 56, Numéro: 3, Pages: 471-481
RelBib Classification:VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Radical atheism
B Metaphysics of modality
B Martin Hägglund
B Markus Gabriel
B The world Ontology
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
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Résumé:According to Markus Gabriel, the world does not exist. This view—baptised metametaphysical nihilism—is exposited at length in his recent book Fields of Sense, which updates his earlier project of transcendental ontology. In this paper, I question whether meta-metaphysical nihilism is internally coherent, specifically whether the proposition ‘the world does not exist' is expressible without performative contradiction on that view. Call this the inexpressibility objection. This is not an original objection—indeed it is anticipated in Gabriel's book. However, I believe that his response to it is inadequate and that I have something illuminating to say about this state of affairs. My claim is that we can distinguish between two senses of ‘the world', one of which is benign and acceptable, the other not. The acceptable sense of ‘the world' suffices to answer the inexpressibility objection—at a certain theoretical cost, of course. To explain what this cost is, I turn briefly to an examination of Martin Hägglund's radical atheism.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contient:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0499-4