Losing the Lost Island
Gaunilo's Lost Island Objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument aims to show that if Anselm's argument can establish the existence of a greatest conceivable being then a very similar argument can establish the existence of a greatest conceivable island. The challenge for the defender...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2018, Volume: 83, Numéro: 1, Pages: 127-134 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Anselm, Canterbury, Erzbischof, Heiliger 1033-1109
/ Preuve ontologique de l’existence de Dieu
/ Gaunilo, Maioris Monasterii
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Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Lost Island
B Ontological Argument B Gaunilo B Anselm |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | Gaunilo's Lost Island Objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument aims to show that if Anselm's argument can establish the existence of a greatest conceivable being then a very similar argument can establish the existence of a greatest conceivable island. The challenge for the defender of Anselm is to identify the relevant disanalogy between Anselm's argument and Gaunilo's, in order to explain why Anselm's can succeed while Gaunilo's fails. In this essay I take up this challenge. Reflection on the differences between the nature of islands and the nature of being yields the relevant disanalogy. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9582-1 |