Methodological naturalism and its misconceptions
Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong i...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 82, Numéro: 3, Pages: 321-336 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Naturalisme (Philosophie)
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Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Creationism
B Empiricism B RELIGION & science B Faith B Religious Aspects B Naturalism B Methodological Naturalism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong interpretation of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism does not constrain the theories that scientists may conjecture, but how those theories may be justified. On this view, methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which supernatural methods of justification, such as faith, are eschewed. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-017-9616-3 |