From Welfare to Rights without Changing the Subject
In this paper I introduce the changing the subject problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2017, Band: 20, Heft: 5, Seiten: 993-1004 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCG Ökologische Ethik; Schöpfungsethik VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Noncognitivism
B Respect B Wellbeing B Expressivism B animal ethics B Circuses B Dignity B Rights B Animals B Pain B Welfare B Animal welfare B Animal Rights |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper I introduce the changing the subject problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from the capacity to suffer and the moral significance of causing animals pain. To avoid this problem and ensure that debate proceeds in the familiar terms of the established welfare paradigm, I present an expressivist analysis of animal rights vocabulary. When terms such as dignity and respect are understood in line with the theory of moral language use known as expressivism, proponents of animal protection that use these terms can escape the charge of changing the subject. Drawing upon Helms theory of love, I show how the usage of rights vocabulary can be respectable way for people to register their concern for the welfare of animals, even at times when it is unlikely that the animals concerned are suffering. Tying rights vocabulary to welfare via expressivism aligns the aims of animal rights with welfare without the theoretical problems associated with attempts to reduce dignity or respect to natural behaviour or inherent value. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9856-4 |