Absolute Power and Contingency: on the Theological Structure of Meillassoux’s Speculative Philosophy

Although Quentin Meillassoux’s philosophy desires to be postmetaphysical and posttheological, I argue in this paper that it remains structurally theological. Specifically, I argue that Meillassoux’s speculative thesis on the contingency of nature and its laws repeats at a formal level the medieval t...

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1. VerfasserIn: Phelps, Hollis (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Netherlands [2015]
In: Sophia
Jahr: 2015, Band: 54, Heft: 3, Seiten: 343-362
RelBib Classification:FA Theologie
KAE Kirchengeschichte 900-1300; Hochmittelalter
NBC Gotteslehre
TK Neueste Zeit
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Duns Scotus
B God’s ordained power
B Omnipotence
B Correlationism
B God’s absolute power
B Thomas Aquinas
B Metaphysics
B Speculative Philosophy
B Contingency
B Hyper-Chaos
B Quentin Meillassoux
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Zusammenfassung:Although Quentin Meillassoux’s philosophy desires to be postmetaphysical and posttheological, I argue in this paper that it remains structurally theological. Specifically, I argue that Meillassoux’s speculative thesis on the contingency of nature and its laws repeats at a formal level the medieval theological distinction between God’s absolute power and God’s ordained power. The first part of this paper discusses how this distinction allowed medieval theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus to understand and have faith in the stable contingency of the present order of things in light of divine omnipotence. The second part of this paper discusses how Meillassoux repeats this distinction, intentionally or not, between God’s absolute power and God’s ordained power in his attempt to think the absolute contingency of the laws of nature as an effect of hyper-Chaos. Although, unlike the medieval God, Meillassoux’s hyper-Chaos remains fundamentally without reason and devoid of any moral valence, I argue in the third section of this paper that Meillassoux sneaks in an existential faith in the present and future order of things with his appeal to hope in a speculative resurrection of the dead, a move that brings him further in line with the substance of the distinction between God’s absolute power and God’s ordained power.
ISSN:1873-930X
Enthält:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-014-0449-6