The Scientific Perspective on Moral Objectivity

The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropologica...

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1. VerfasserIn: Wilson, Catherine 1951- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2017, Band: 20, Heft: 4, Seiten: 723-736
RelBib Classification:NBE Anthropologie
NCA Ethik
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Evolutionary Ethics
B Moral objectivity
B Moral Progress
B Relativism
B Altruism
B Moral naturalism
B Is-ought problem
B moral epistemology
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Zusammenfassung:The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropological approach which leads to an objectionable form of relativism. There is no single method for arriving at moral objectivity any more than there is a single method that has taken us from alchemy to modern chemistry. Rather, there is an ensemble of (cognitive) instruments, techniques, experiments and observations that contribute to eliminating moral error, delivering what we are entitled to call greater objectivity.
ISSN:1572-8447
Enthält:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9798-x