The Scientific Perspective on Moral Objectivity
The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropologica...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2017, Band: 20, Heft: 4, Seiten: 723-736 |
RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCA Ethik VA Philosophie |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Evolutionary Ethics
B Moral objectivity B Moral Progress B Relativism B Altruism B Moral naturalism B Is-ought problem B moral epistemology |
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Zusammenfassung: | The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropological approach which leads to an objectionable form of relativism. There is no single method for arriving at moral objectivity any more than there is a single method that has taken us from alchemy to modern chemistry. Rather, there is an ensemble of (cognitive) instruments, techniques, experiments and observations that contribute to eliminating moral error, delivering what we are entitled to call greater objectivity. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9798-x |