Virtue of Self-Regulation
This paper proposes the idea of thinking about practical rationality in terms of self-regulation and defends the thesis that self-regulation is a virtue, insofar as we have reason to think it is our highest form of practical rationality. I argue that understanding self-regulation as a virtuous form...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2017, Volume: 20, Numéro: 3, Pages: 505-517 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCB Éthique individuelle VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Situationism
B Generosity B Virtue B Automaticity B Practical rationality B Self-regulation |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | This paper proposes the idea of thinking about practical rationality in terms of self-regulation and defends the thesis that self-regulation is a virtue, insofar as we have reason to think it is our highest form of practical rationality. I argue that understanding self-regulation as a virtuous form of practical reasoning is called for given the kinds of limitations we face in developing agency and pursuing our goals, and presents us with several advantages over traditional understandings of practical rationality. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9800-7 |