In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Sharadin, Nathaniel (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
Dans: Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2017, Volume: 20, Numéro: 2, Pages: 375-392
RelBib Classification:NCA Éthique
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Humour
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Résumé:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contient:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3