Rightness, Parsimony, and Consequentialism: A Response to Peterson
This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the standard view of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins (section 1) with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to deontic leaps. It goes on (section 2) to claim that g...
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| Collaborateurs: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Review |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2016, Volume: 19, Numéro: 1, Pages: 39-47 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Deontology
B Rationality B Rightness B Compte-rendu de lecture B Consequentialism B Peterson, Martin |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the standard view of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins (section 1) with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to deontic leaps. It goes on (section 2) to claim that greater conceptual parsimony would allow Peterson to avoid certain problems involving equality and related matters that arise out of his conception of moral value, and that Peterson should take the same instrumentalist attitude towards the norms of practical rationality as he does towards the norms of common-sense morality. The paper closes (section 3) with some doubts about Petersons programme of consequentialization and its alleged advantages. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Référence: | Kritik in "The Dimensions of Consequentialism (2016)"
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9671-8 |