Rightness, Parsimony, and Consequentialism: A Response to Peterson

This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the ‘standard view’ of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins (section 1) with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to ‘deontic leaps’. It goes on (section 2) to claim that g...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Crisp, Roger 1961- (Author)
Contributors: Peterson, Martin 1975- (Bibliographic antecedent)
Format: Electronic Review
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 1, Pages: 39-47
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Book review
B Deontology
B Rationality
B Rightness
B Consequentialism
B Peterson, Martin
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)

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