Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant’s Categorical Imperative?

Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Yudanin, Michael (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2015]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2015, Band: 18, Heft: 3, Seiten: 595-614
RelBib Classification:NCA Ethik
TJ Neuzeit
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Ethics
B Deontology
B Positive duties
B Categorical Imperative
B Negative duties
B Kant
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Zusammenfassung:Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.
ISSN:1572-8447
Enthält:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4