Situationism versus Situationism
Most discussions of John Doris's situationism center on what can be called descriptive situationism, the claim that our folk usage of global personality and character traits in describing and predicting human behavior is empirically unsupported. Philosophers have not yet paid much attention to...
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Collaborateurs: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2015, Volume: 18, Numéro: 1, Pages: 9-26 |
RelBib Classification: | NCB Éthique individuelle VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Virtue Ethics
John Doris
Situationism
Character
Virtue
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Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | Most discussions of John Doris's situationism center on what can be called descriptive situationism, the claim that our folk usage of global personality and character traits in describing and predicting human behavior is empirically unsupported. Philosophers have not yet paid much attention to another central claim of situationism, which says that given that local traits are empirically supported, we can more successfully act in line with our moral values if, in our deliberation about what to do, we focus on our situation instead of on our moral character. Call this prescriptive situationism. In this paper, we will point toward a previously unrecognized tension between these two situationist theses and explore some ways for the situationist to address it. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9481-9 |