In Defense of a Critical Commonsensist Conception of Knowledge

Questioning doubt is much more recent than questioning knowledge, and may be traced back to Charles Sanders Peirce and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both have a close pragmatist strategy and reject the relevance of the radical Cartesian scenario. However, despite a common diagnosis of what goes wrong with th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Tiercelin, Claudine 1952- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2016
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 182-202
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 / Peirce, Charles S. 1839-1914 / Knowledge / Conception / Common sense / Inference
Further subjects:B Scepticism hinge propositions critical common sensism epistemic practice Peirce Wittgenstein
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)

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520 |a Questioning doubt is much more recent than questioning knowledge, and may be traced back to Charles Sanders Peirce and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both have a close pragmatist strategy and reject the relevance of the radical Cartesian scenario. However, despite a common diagnosis of what goes wrong with the sceptic and of some illusions he entertains about thinking, knowledge, and the way they are related to practice and action, the replies are not the same. Whereas Wittgenstein wavers between a realistic reaction and a neo-Pyrrhonian attitude, Peirce’s offensive attack strongly relies on a metaphysical and scientific version of realism and on a critical Common Sensist method of inquiry. Both philosophers insist on relying on first principles or hinge propositions, but also illustrate rather different views about these. The aim of this paper is to try and show how and why, in the end, Peirce’s Critical Commonsensist and fallibilistic attitude seems a better strategy, both as an account of the logic of our epistemic practices and as a convincing parry to scepticism. 
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