Scepticism, Truth, and Value
In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work.
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2014
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Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2014, Volume: 4, Numéro: 1, Pages: 51-62 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Pyrrhonism
Sextus Empiricus
belief
skepticism
reason
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Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-04011146 |