Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism

Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Walker, Mark (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2016
Dans: International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2016, Volume: 6, Numéro: 1, Pages: 1-29
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Dogmatisme / Rasoir d'Ockham / Scepticisme
Sujets non-standardisés:B Underdetermination Sextus Empiricus Occam’s Razor abduction inference to the best explanation skepticism
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Résumé:Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contient:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05011168