Wittgenstein on Mathematics and Certainties
This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2016
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2016, Band: 6, Heft: 2/3, Seiten: 120-142 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Theorem
/ Gewissheit
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| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Wittgenstein
Marie McGinn
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
mathematics
certainties
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| Online Zugang: |
Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model for the latter. However, I disagree with McGinn’s and Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretations concerning Wittgenstein’s views of both relata. I argue that mathematical sentences as well as certainties are true and are propositions; that some of them can be epistemically justified; that in some senses they are not prior to empirical knowledge; that they are not ineffable; and that their primary function is epistemic as much as it is semantic. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603004 |