Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil
Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 81, Numéro: 3, Pages: 273-289 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Burial
B Allowing B Doing B GOOD & evil B Theodicy B problem of evil B DISTINCTION (Philosophy) B Kantian ethics |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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520 | |a Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against (i) I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are only exacerbated when applied to God. Against (ii) I argue that broadly Kantian considerations give a better explanation of the moral differences in paradigm cases than the doing-allowing distinction and, when applied to God, effectively dissolve the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction. The upshot of this is that those who claim God does evil are no worse off than those who claim God allows evil regarding the PoE. | ||
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650 | 4 | |a Kantian ethics | |
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