Skeptical theism, moral skepticism, and epistemic propriety
Respondents to the argument from evil who follow Michael Bergmann's development of skeptical theism hold that our failure to determine God's reasons for permitting evil does not disconfirm theism (i.e. render theism less probable on the evidence of evil than it would be if merely evaluated...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 81, Numéro: 3, Pages: 263-272 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Theism
B BERGMANN, Michael B Argument from suffering B GOOD & evil B Theodicy B problem of evil B Skeptical theism B Skepticism B moral skepticism B Moral paralysis |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |