Is My Feeling Your Pain Bad for Others? Empathy as Virtue Versus Empathy as Fixed Trait

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it alw...

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Bibliographic Details
Subtitles:Is empathy immoral?
Main Author: Peterson, Gregory R. 1966- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2017]
In: Zygon
Year: 2017, Volume: 52, Issue: 1, Pages: 232-257
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Bloom, Paul 1963- / Prinz, Jesse J. / Empathy / Moral act
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
AE Psychology of religion
NCC Social ethics
Further subjects:B Paul Bloom
B emotional empathy
B Virtue
B Cognitive empathy
B Dual processing
B Jesse Prinz
B Moral Psychology
Online Access: Volltext (doi)

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520 |a The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly. 
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